

M-2

TAB


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11 August 1971

INTRA-AGENCY SECURITY COMMITTEE

Minutes of


Second Meeting  
Room 4 E 64, CIA Headquarters Building  
Wednesday, 11 August 1971, 1400 Hours

25X1A9a

  
Acting Chairman  
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT:

25X1A9a



REPRESENTING:

Office of General Counsel

National Intelligence Programs  
Evaluation

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Deputy Director for Science  
& Technology

Deputy Director for Plans

Deputy Director for Support

Secretary

GROUP I

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

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The Intra-agency Security Committee was convened by the Acting  
25X1A9a Chairman, Mr. [REDACTED] at 1400 hours on 11 August 1971 in the  
Office of Security conference room, 4 E 64.

25X1A9a [REDACTED] advised that he wished to furnish the Committee with  
a rundown on some of the recent activities involving the proposed changes  
in Executive Order 10501 and to get a consensus on several proposed  
changes which would raise the protection of intelligence sources and  
methods to Executive Order level.

As background information, he read, in part, from President  
Nixon's memorandum to multiple addressees of the intelligence  
community dated 21 December 1970 wherein the President wrote  
that he was becoming increasingly concerned about the disclosure  
in public media of classified information bearing upon important  
aspects of national security, particularly that which tends to  
jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. Such disclosures,  
the President pointed out, present a serious threat to the national  
interest and that he was determined to bring to an end the practice  
of releasing such information without proper authorization.

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The President directed that a review be made of security classification and declassification procedures as set forth in Executive Order 10501 as well as dissemination procedures. The Attorney General appointed Mr. William Rehnquist, Department of Justice, to chair a Security Review Committee to do the job and come up with appropriate changes. The Acting Chairman said that the review presented an opportunity to raise the protection of intelligence sources and methods to Executive Order level and the Security Review Committee has come up with proposals which incorporate the wording of DCID No. 1/7 with one exception which relates to Warning Notices.

The Acting Chairman distributed copies of the Security Review Committee's proposals for inclusion in the revision of EO 10501.

The proposals were:

(1) Under Section 5 "Marking of Classified Material," subparagraph (j)(4), the Intra-agency Security Committee members unanimously incorporated the following change:

"For classified material containing sensitive intelligence information, the following warning

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notice shall be used, in addition to and in  
conjunction with those prescribed in (1), (2),  
or (3), above, as appropriate."

changed to--

"For classified material involving sensitive  
intelligence sources and methods, the following  
warning notice shall be used, in addition to and  
in conjunction with those prescribed in (1), (2),  
or (3), above, as appropriate."

(2) Also under Section 5(j)(4):

"Warning Notice - Sensitive Sources and  
Methods Involved"

changed to--

"Warning Notice - Sensitive Intelligence  
Sources and Methods Involved"

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(3) Section 12. "Restricted Data," Material Formerly  
Designated as "Restricted Data," Communications Intelligence  
and Cryptography"

changed to--

Section 12. "Restricted Data," Material Formerly  
Designated as "Restricted Data," Communications Intelligence,  
Cryptography and Intelligence Sources and Methods"

(4) Under Appendix to Executive Order 10501

Definition of Terms:

"Sensitive Intelligence: Sensitive intelligence  
information is that classified intelligence, the  
unauthorized disclosure of which could lead to  
counteraction (a) jeopardizing the continued  
productivity of intelligence sources and methods  
which provide information vital to the national  
security or (b) offsetting the value of intelligence  
vital to the national security."

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changed to--

"Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods:

Sensitive intelligence sources and methods are  
those which produce classified intelligence, the  
unauthorized disclosure of which could lead to  
counteraction (a) jeopardizing the continued  
productivity of intelligence sources and methods  
which provide information vital to the national  
security or (b) offsetting the value of intelligence  
vital to the national security."

The Committee felt that by incorporating the above changes that  
it was transposing into the proposed Executive Order 10501 the best of  
the classification policies contained in DCID No. 1/7 while at the same  
time injecting intelligence sources and methods in the strongest, most  
definitive way. The Office of General Counsel representative, Mr. [REDACTED] K1A9a

25X1A9a


[REDACTED] said that by so doing it would make any future sanction against  
a person or persons guilty of willfully causing an unauthorized disclosure

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somewhat easier to adjudicate since ignorance of the intelligence aspect would appear to be indefensible.

The Committee members agreed that in all likelihood, if the proposals are enacted into law, DCID No. 1/7 will have to be revised in order to raise certain categories of intelligence to a new, higher level of classification in order to identify them as being in the "super sensitive" category.

Adjournment: 1520 hours

  
Secretary

25X1A9a